ADAMS, ROBERT. “Theories of actuality.”. Noûs, Vol. 8 (), pp. – CrossRef. CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI. “Individuation and. In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. It has been argued that actualism – the view that there are no non-actual objects and nestedmodal operators require stipulation of nested possible worlds.

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Philosophical Studies 2: The Way Things Were.

Actualism and Possible Worlds

This leaves open the question, of course, of what an actually existing “way the world could be” is ; and on this question actualists are divided. Science Logic and Mathematics. Poxsible of course invites a certain question, namely, just why is it less objectionable to have objects with the latter modal properties than the former one. How to subscribe Recommend opssible my Librarian.

This theory is then to be applied as follows. Postulating objects with modal properties such as this seems less objectionable to the actualist than postulating objects with the modal properties described at the beginning of this paragraph. Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service.

Donnellan – – Philosophical Review 83 1: This article has no associated abstract. Classical, Early, and Medieval Prose wkrlds Writers: Recently viewed 1 Actualism and Possible Sign in Create an account.

A state of affairs w is a world just in case it is possible that w includes all and only states of affairs that obtain. We can now define several critical notions: Jeff Speaks – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 3: An important, but significantly different notion of possibilism known as modal realism was developed by the philosopher David Lewis. History of Western Philosophy.

Hence, they argue, there are innumerably many possible worlds other than our own, which exist just as much as ours does. Most actualists will be happy to grant the interpretation of “Sherlock Holmes’ existence is possible” in terms of possible worlds. No keywords specified fix it. I begin by demonstrating how on the Canonical Conception of possible worlds one is committed to the idea that there are, or could have been, nonexistent objects.


possiible Gabriel Uzquiano – – Philosophy Compass 10 4: Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Show More Show Less Keywords: The possibilist argues that apparent existential claims such as this that “there are” possible worlds of various sorts ought to be taken more or less at face value: So, from this point of view, what distinguishes the actual world from other possible worlds is what distinguishes reality from a description of a simulation of reality, this world from Sherlock Holmes’: Supplement to Actualism An Account of Abstract Possible Worlds As an example of actualistically acceptable abstract worlds, we draw chiefly upon Plantinga’s account.

Public users can worlde freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. For the philosophy of Giovanni Gentile, often called actualism, see Actual idealism.

Added to PP index Total downloads 10, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 24 18, of 2, How can I increase my downloads? Therefore, as Lewis is happy to admit, there is a world where someone named Sherlock Holmes lived at b Baker Street in Victorian times, there oossible another world where pigs workds, and there is even another world where both Sherlock Holmes exists and pigs fly.

Consider the statement ” Sherlock Holmes exists. Actualism and Possibilism in Metaphysics. Modal Truthmakers and Two Varieties of Actualism. According to the indexical conception of actuality, favoured by Lewisactuality is an attribute which our world has relative to itself, but which all the other worlds have relative to themselves too.

Importantly, note that a state of affairs can exist without obtaining, just as a proposition can exist without being true. As an example of actualistically actualim abstract worlds, we draw poesible upon Plantinga’s account.

In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism — i. In contemporary analytic philosophyactualism is the view that everything there is i. The actualist argues, poszible, that poswible we claim “possible worlds” exist we are making claims that things exist in our own actual world which can serve as possible worlds for the interpretation of modal claims: A possible world is a state of affairs that could be such that it includes all and only states of affairs that obtain.


The Nature of Necessity.

Actualism > An Account of Abstract Possible Worlds (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

That the latter distinction is more intelligible than the former ones is often just assumed by the actualist without argument. Richard Montague – – In Richmond H. Request removal from index. Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality Author s: Since it is maximally complete, only one such state of affairs could actually obtain; all the others would differ from the actual world in various large or small lossible.

User Account Sign in. Possible worlds are mere descriptions of ways this world the actual one might have been, and nothing else. Furthermore, in putting forward this pissible, the actualist has not invoked any objects which have such modal properties as being a possible million carat diamond, being a possible talking donkey, actulism a possible Alien, etc.

Another common actualist account, advanced in different forms by Alvin Plantinga and David Armstrong views “possible worlds” not as descriptions of how the world might be through a very large set of statements but rather as a maximally possile state of affairs that covers every state of affairs which might obtain or not obtain. I then develop an actualist conception of possible worlds, properties, and essences.

Actualsim a state of affairs is possible, then it really obtains, it physically occurs in at least one world. This step is, therefore, consistent with Thesis A.